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Does Climate Change Justify Compulsory Licensing of
Green Technology?
Robert Fair*
I. INTRODUCTION
The impact of the developing world on global pollution has
increased dramatically in recent years. China recently surpassed the
United States as the largest producer of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the
world.1 Chinese emissions accounted for two-thirds of the worldwide
increase in CO2 in 2007, and its pollution levels continue to rise. 2 India
and Russia have also experienced dramatic increases. In 2007, India and
Russia were each responsible for about ten percent of the increase in
worldwide emissions. 3 In contrast, the European Union decreased its
emission levels that year.4
Calls from the developed world for developing countries to reduce
their increasing share of global pollution are somewhat hypocritical,5 as
many developed states, particularly those in Western Europe, went
through a similar stage of development that was accompanied by harmful
pollution. 6 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, London was
“bathed in smoke” so toxic that thousands of people died from it; yet air
pollution received little attention until the 1950s. 7 It has been argued that
* University of Pennsylvania Law School, J.D. 2010; Vassar College, B.A. 2004. I would like to
thank Professor Osagie Imasogie for his thoughtful comments and guidance on this Article.
1. John Vidal & David Adam, China Overtakes U.S. as World's Biggest CO2 Emitter,
GUARDIAN, June 19, 2007, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/jun/19/china.usnews; see also Neth. Envtl.
Assessment Agency, China Now No. 1 in CO2 emissions; USA in Second Position,
http://www.pbl.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/moreinfo/Chinanowno1inCO2emissionsUSAinsecond
position.html.
2. Nether. Envtl. Assessment Agency, Global CO2 emissions: increase continued in 2007
(June 13, 2008), http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/2008/GlobalCO2emissionsthrough2007.html.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. West Told to Stop Blaming Developing Countries for Pollution, CHINA D AILY, Jun. 25,
2007, available at http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/25/content_901695.html.
6. Kelly McParland, China Achieves Olympian Pollution Levels, NAT’L POST, Jul. 9, 2008,
available at http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/posted/archive/2008/07/09/china-achieve-solympian-pollution-levels.aspx; Kevin D. Hill, Smog, Science and the EPA, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 4–
5 (1997).
7. Hill, supra note 6, at 4–5.
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if the developed world was allowed to progress without regard to the
harmful environmental consequences accompanying that development,
states currently developing should not be denied the same opportunity.
While this argument is not wholly without merit, developing states need
not necessarily choose between economic development and pollution
reduction. Instead, these states could “leap-frog” the stage of
development that requires heavy pollution by implementing some of the
existing and forthcoming technologies that promote sustainable and
renewable forms of energy. 8
However, the development of such innovative technology is costly.
To offset these significant costs, most innovative firms and individuals
seek to protect their inventions with patents, which give them a statutory
monopoly over the use and dissemination of the technology for at least
twenty years.9 Strong intellectual property rights (IPR) are important for
creating the economic incentives necessary for technology firms to
devote time and money to developing innovative technology. 10 However,
this strong protection also increases costs to consumers in the developing
states that import these innovations, 11 and prevents polluters in these
states from taking advantage of patented green technology without
paying for a license. 12 States that understandably focus more on reducing
poverty and increasing economic growth than reducing harmful
emissions are unable or unwilling to pay for such licenses, and high startup costs prevent them from entering the market themselves. 13 Thus,
while strong intellectual property protections increase incentives to
create innovative clean energy technology that may help reduce harmful
8. Deborah L. Cohen, VC Group’s Heesen Says Clean Tech Still Hot, REUTERS, Jun. 2,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/smallBusinessNews/idUSTRE5516J620090602
(stating that energy technology investment has increased from two percent five years ago to fifteen
percent of total venture capital).
9. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 229,
33 I.L.M 1125, 1208 art. 31 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS] (stating the period of
patent protection shall be no less than twenty years); Tim Wilson, Undermining Mitigation
Technology: Compulsory Licensing, Patents and Tariffs, Australian Institute of Public Affairs, Aug.
2008, 21/1, 4, available at http://www.apec.org.au/docs/08_IPAAASC_MT.pdf.
10. Grace K. Avedissian, Note, Global Implications of a Potential U.S. Policy Shift Toward
Compulsory Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of "Super-Terrorism," 18 AM. U. I NT'L L.
REV. 237, 244–46 (2002).
11. Colleen Spring Zimmerman, Overview: Intellectual Property—The New Global Currency,
in 1 INTELLECTUAL PROP. IN THE G LOBAL MARKETPLACE 0.1, 0.5 (Melvin Simensky et al. eds.,
1999).
12. Jason Weiner, Sharing Potential and the Potential for Sharing: Open Source Licensing as
a Legal and Economic Modality for the Dissemination of Renewable Energy Technology, 18 GEO.
INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 277, 278 (2006).
13. Wilson, supra note 9, at 4; Weiner, supra note 12, at 278.
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emissions, those same protections may actually impede the diffusion of
clean energy technology to the developing world, which is rapidly
becoming the major source of those emissions. 14
The response to this dilemma from developing states has been
similar to their response to the issue of whether they have a right to
pollute. Just as current developed states were great polluters while they
developed, those same developed states also ignored intellectual property
rights during their development. 15 Developing states see no valid reason
prohibiting them from doing the same. 16 However, rather than
supporting outright theft of patented energy-efficient technology,
developing states have advocated for the temporary removal of patent
protection for such technology. 17
The concept of relaxing IPR with regards to green technology has
considerable support, both in developing and developed states. U.S.
President Barack Obama has opined that, “it’s critical for us to lead by
example by becoming more energy efficient [and by] shar[ing] scientific
breakthroughs.”18 Even stronger statements have come from the
developing world. The 2007 Joint Position Paper of Brazil, China, India,
Mexico and South Africa Participating in the G-8 Summit, stated:
In order for developing countries to contribute to the efforts
to address climate change, access to adequate technology is a
key enabling condition. We need an agreement on transfer of
technologies at affordable costs for accelerated mitigation
efforts in developing countries, inter alia through increased
use of renewable energy, including biofuels, and enhanced
energy efficiency. Rewards for innovators needs to be
balanced with common good for humankind. 19
Bolivian President Evo Morales advocated the relaxation of IPR
pertaining to climate change technology “so that all countries can access
14. Dr. Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing a Glove on the Invisible Hand: How Intellectual
Property Rights May Impede Innovation in Energy Research and Development (R&D), 18 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 381, 387 (2008).
15. See
Battle
of
Ideas,
ECONOMIST,
Apr.
23,
2009,
available
at
http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13528318 (stating that the United
States “was the great copyright and patent infringer when it was a developing country in the 18th
century”).
16. Id.
17. Wilson, supra note 9.
18. Full Text of Barack Obama’s Strasbourg Town Hall with Questions, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3,
2009, available at http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washington/2009/04/full-text-of-barack-obamain-strasbourg-town-hall.html.
19. Joint Position Paper of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa Participating in the
G-8 Summit, June 8, 2007, available at http://pmindia.nic.in/visits/content.asp?id=155.
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products already patented. . .free of cost.”20 Nigeria, Indonesia, and even
the European Parliament have all made similar statements. 21
While the notion of sharing energy efficient technology may be lofty,
the economic and legal reality is that green technology has become big
business. The corporations and inventors who create these innovations
use the global IPR system to profit (sometimes greatly) from them for the
entire length of the statutory monopoly granted by patents. When IPR
have been threatened in the past, corporations have taken drastic
measures in response.22 It is unlikely that these corporations will give up
these rights without resistance, especially given the recent increase in
venture capital investment in renewable energy technology. 23 Therefore,
any relaxation of IPR for green technology would have to come not from
the patent owners themselves, but from the legal institutions that grant
statutory monopolies to those patent owners. The Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) allows for the
issuance of compulsory licenses, which could, in theory, be used to
address the problem posed by increased pollution by the developing
world.24
TRIPS allows for compulsory licensing of patented technology
without the authorization of the patent owner in times of “emergency.” 25
Such licenses have typically been employed in the past for
pharmaceutical products used to fight epidemics such as AIDS, but the
scope of compulsory licensing has recently been widened to include
long-term health problems such as heart disease and cancer. 26 With this
in mind, some argue that environmental pollution may be considered a
long-term health problem because it leads to the premature death of
millions each year. There is currently no bar to granting compulsory
licenses for green technology, and support for such use of compulsory
licenses arguably exists in other provisions of TRIPS and in certain areas
of patent law. 27
However, the wide implementation of such a practice would have
20. Sidney A. Rosenzweig, PFF on Cooling the World By Misappropriating Patent Rights,
Intellectual Property Watch, Apr. 1, 2009, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/04/01/cooling-theworld-by-misappropriating-patent-rights/.
21. Wilson, supra note 9, at 5.
22. See infra notes 87–97.
23. Michael Hasper, Green Technology in Developing Countries: Creating Accessibility
Through a Global Exchange Forum, D UKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 4 (2009).
24. Andrew W. Torrance, Patents to the Rescue: Disasters and Patent Law, 10 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 309, 327 (2007).
25. TRIPS, supra note 9, at art. 31.
26. See infra Section 3.2.
27. See infra Section 3.
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serious negative ramifications. Increased use of compulsory licensing
would almost certainly elicit a harmful backlash from the owners of the
appropriated patents, as well as from their respective states. In addition,
several key differences between the energy industry and the
pharmaceutical industry make compulsory licensing far less appropriate
in the former than in the latter. Finally, there are more effective methods
of transferring energy-efficient technology to developing states, such as
removing tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. Thus, while an argument
can certainly be made for using compulsory licensing of green
technology to help combat climate change, several drawbacks prevent
this route from being the best option for effectively transferring green
technology to developing states.
II. COMPULSORY LICENSING UNDER TRIPS
Under TRIPS, all members of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
must provide a minimum level of patent protection, which includes the
right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or importing patented
inventions for the term of the patent. 28 The intellectual property rights set
forth in TRIPS are enforceable through the WTO’s highly effective
system of dispute resolution. 29 However, those rights are not absolute.
While the TRIPS agreement does not use the term “compulsory
licensing,” Article 31 clearly pertains to compulsory licensing and could
be used to argue for such licensing of green technology.30 Article 31 sets
forth a procedural prior negotiation requirement between users and
patent owners that must be met before the patents can be used without
authorization. However, this requirement may be waived in the case of
“national emergency, other circumstances of extreme urgency, and in
cases of public non-commercial use.”31 Under such a scenario, a state
may allow its citizens to produce the patented invention without giving
notice to, or receiving authorization from the owner of the patent.32 The
2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS further encouraged states to take
advantage of compulsory licensing by stating that “[e]ach Member has
the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the
28. TRIPS, supra note 9, at arts. 27, 28, 31.
29. Cynthia M. Ho, Patent Breaking of Balancing?: Separating Strands of Fact from Fiction
Under TRIPS, 34 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 371, 384 (2009).
30. Peggy B. Sherman & Ellwood F. Oakley, III, Pandemics and Panaceas: The World Trade
Organization's Efforts to Balance Pharmaceutical Patents and Access to AIDS Drugs, 41 AM. BUS.
L.J. 353, 369 (2004).
31. TRIPS, supra note 9, at art. 31.
32. Sherman, supra note 30, at 369.
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grounds upon which [compulsory] licenses are granted.”33
Once a compulsory license has been granted, a state may
domestically produce the patented technology or import it from abroad,
as the benefits of compulsory licensing during “national emergencies”
are not limited to states that have the domestic manufacturing capability
to produce the licensed product. The 2003 WTO decision entitled
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health authorizes a WTO member, under certain
circumstances, to grant a compulsory license for exporting a
pharmaceutical product to a state that faces a “national emergency” but
lacks the manufacturing capacity necessary to produce that product. 34
The EU has adopted a similar regulation that permits compulsory
licensing of pharmaceutical products for exportation to developing states
with “public health problems.”35
Compulsory licensing provisions exist in TRIPS and in many
countries’ intellectual property laws because they relate to one of the
most basic purposes of patent law: to provide incentives to spur
innovation, specifically for the good of the public that benefits from that
innovation.36 Generally, the practice of providing incentives for
innovation by creating a proprietary interest in the resulting technology
serves the public good. However, economic rewards and the public good
occasionally conflict, particularly during times of emergency. During
these times, the patent owner of a product desperately needed to help
those affected by the emergency situation might keep prices high and
production low.37 Thus, compulsory licensing in emergency
circumstances helps serve an underlying purpose of intellectual property
law.
III. PAST THREATS AND USES OF COMPULSORY LICENSING
While the U.S. Supreme Court observed that “[c]ompulsory
33. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/W/2 , 41 I.L.M. 755, 755 (2002), [hereinafter Doha Declaration]
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/tripshealth.pdf.
34. World Trade Organization, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540, 43 I.L.M. 509, 510 (2004) [hereinafter 2003 WTO
Decision] http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_E/TRIPS_e/implem_para6_e.htm.
35. Council Regulation 816/20062006 O.J. (L 157) (May 17, 2006) [hereinafter 2006 Council
Regulation],
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:157:0001:01:EN:HTML.
36. Giles S. Rich, Foreword in F. SCOTT KIEFF, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS iii, iii (4th ed. 2008).
37. Torrance, supra note 24, at 327.
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licensing is a rarity in our patent system” 38 there is an established history
of such licenses being threatened or issued, both in the United States and
abroad. This Section first discusses governmental threats to ignore patent
rights, and then considers incidences where governments have gone
beyond threats and have granted compulsory licenses for certain
technology.
A. Threats
Often a threat by a government to ignore patent rights is enough for
owners of those rights to lower the prices of their patented products.39
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, letters contaminated with anthrax entered
the U.S. postal system, resulting in the death of five Americans. 40 The
pharmaceutical company Bayer AG had a patent covering the antibiotic
Cipro(R) that could be used to treat anthrax infections, but the company
was unable to produce enough of the drug to keep up with the sudden
spike in demand. 41 The U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services
started to pressure Bayer publicly about the price and supply of Cipro(R),
and threatened to ignore the company’s patent. 42 Bayer then agreed to
lower its price by fifty-five percent and considerably increase its capacity
for manufacturing the antibiotic. 43
A similar situation arose in response to the global bird flu epidemic
in 2005 and 2006.44 Roche, a pharmaceutical company, owned the patent
for Tamiflu(R), a potentially lifesaving drug, but was unable to deliver
all its orders for the drug during the epidemic. 45 U.S. Senator Chuck
Schumer denounced Roche for elevating profits above health concerns
and demanded that the firm license its technology to other drug-makers

38. Dawson Chemical v. Rohm & Haas, 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980).
39. Jennifer L. Rich, Roche Reaches Accord on Drug with Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2001,
at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/01/business/roche-reaches-accord-on-drugwith-brazil.html (describing how Roche agreed to drop the price of an AIDS drug by more than forty
percent in Brazil after such a threat).
40. FBI - Post-9/11 Amerithrax Investigation,
http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithraxlinks.htm.
41. Anthony York, Is It Time to Bust the Cipro Patent?, SALON, Oct. 18, 2001, available at
http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2001/10/18/cipro_patent/index.html.
42. Matt Fleischer-Black, The Cipro Dilemma—In the Anthrax Crisis, Tommy Thompson
Distorted Patent Law to Save Public Health. Good Move?, 1 AM. LAWYER 53 Jan. 2002, available
at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro/americanlawyer012002.html.
43. Unmesh Kher, Why Roche Released Tamiflu, TIME, Oct. 19, 2005, available at
http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1120533,00.html.
44. Torrance, supra note 24, at 343.
45. Sebastian Mallaby, A Double Dose of Failure, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2005, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/06/AR2005110601013.html.
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or face legislation compelling it to do so. 46 Other states went further.
Taiwan, India, Thailand, and Argentina said they would completely
ignore Roche’s patent and manufacture their own versions of
Tamiflu(R).47 Roche eventually relented and entered into discussions to
license the production of the drug at more favorable prices.48
B. Uses
On occasion, governments have done more than merely threaten to
invoke their compulsory licensing rights under TRIPS. In confronting an
AIDS epidemic in 2005, Brazil followed through on its threat to break
the patents owned by the drug manufacturer Abbott Laboratories. The
Brazilian legislature approved a bill that suspended the patents and
authorized local production of generic versions of all drugs used to treat
HIV. 49 The Brazilian government claimed that this bill was compliant
with its obligations under TRIPS, because it simply suspended these
patents temporarily due to a health emergency. 50 Abbott Laboratories
subsequently responded to the move by lowering the price it charged for
a combination of anti-retroviral drugs used to treat HIV, saving Brazil an
estimated $250 million.51
Similarly, in 2007, Thailand approved a compulsory license for the
AIDS drug Kaletra after failing in its attempts to receive a price
reduction on the drug.52 The license allowed domestic drug makers to
copy the patent holder’s formula and sell the medicine domestically,
saving thousands of lives.53 The United States, although unhappy with
this action, acknowledged Thailand’s legal right to issue the license
under TRIPS. Additionally, former U.S. President Bill Clinton endorsed
the decision to grant a compulsory license. 54
46. Id.
47. Id.; James Packard Love, Research Note, Recent Examples of the Use of Compulsory
Licenses on Patents, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’ L 2 (Mar. 8, 2007), available at
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/recent_cls.pdf.
48. Kher, supra note 43.
49. Mary Ann Liebert, Brazil, Abbott Reach Tentative Deal on Kaletra, 24 BIOTECH. L.
REPORT 583, 583–84 (2005), available at
http://www.itssd.org/References/Market/biotch%20law%20rptr%20-%2010-2005%20%20ITSSD%20cited.pdf.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Keith Alcorn, Abbott to Withhold New Drugs from Thailand in Retaliation for Kaletra
Compulsory License, AIDS Map News, Mar. 15, 2007,
http://www.aidsmap.com/en/news/00C7641B-57F5-4AB8-8876-9040425D4464.asp.
53. Charles Collins-Chase, The Case Against TRIPS-Plus Protection in Developing Countries
Facing AIDS Epidemics, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 763, 788 (2008).
54. Celia Dugger, Clinton Foundation Announces a Bargain on Generic AIDS Drugs, N.Y.
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Even states incapable of domestically manufacturing the licensed
products have benefited from compulsory licensing. In 2007, Canada
took advantage of the 2003 WTO Decision Implementation of Paragraph
6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health
by issuing a compulsory license for the production and export of an
AIDS drug to Rwanda.55 Compulsory licenses have also been granted by
Eritrea, Ghana, Guinea, Malaysia, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe for the
importation of AIDS medication from abroad. 56 While incidents of
compulsory licensing may indeed be rare, they are becoming less so.
Their use, or threatened use, to provide lower-priced medication to the
developing world provides a helpful precedent supporting the argument
that such licensing can be used for green technology.
IV. MAKING THE CASE THAT CLIMATE CHANGE CONSTITUTES AN
EMERGENCY FOR THE PURPOSES OF COMPULSORY LICENSING
As stated above, Article 31 of TRIPS permits compulsory licensing
in the “case of national emergency” or for “public non-commercial
use.”57 Issuing compulsory licenses for green technology is unlikely to
be considered “public non-commercial use” because such technology
will undoubtedly be attached to some sort of commercial enterprise. Yet
a case can be made that environmental pollution is a “national
emergency” in the developing world, and thus compulsory licensing of
green technology should be permissible. Sixteen of the twenty most
polluted cities in the world are in China.58 Air pollution alone
prematurely kills between two and three million people annually, 59 and
about ninety percent of those deaths occur in the developing world. 60
This number is much higher than the combined number of deaths from
Bird Flu and Anthrax,61 and compulsory licenses were threatened for
TIMES, May 8, 2007, at A9, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/world/09aidsdrugs.html.
55. Watson, supra note 54, at 147.
56. Love, supra note 47, at 2.
57. TRIPS, supra note 9, at art. 31.
58. Rachel Oliver, All About: Developing Cities and Pollution, CNN, Mar. 11, 2008,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/03/09/eco.cities/index.html.
59. World Health Organization (WHO), Estimated Deaths & DALYs Attributable to Selected
Environmental
Risk
Factors,
by
WHO
Member
State
(2002),
available
at
http://www.cleanairnet.org/caiasia/1412/article-71943.html.
60. Population Information Program, Pollution and Health Risks, Population Reports (2000),
available at http://www.infoforhealth.org/pr/m15/m15chap2.html.
61. WHO, Cumulative Number of Confirmed Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1)
(Sept.
24,
2009),
available
at
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2009_09_24/en/index.html
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each of those emergencies.
While in the past compulsory licensing has been used primarily for
pharmaceutical products, Article 31 of TRIPS could conceivably be used
by a state to
force the patentee of an eco-friendly invention to allow
its use by the state. For instance, if a country’s government
could not wait twenty. . .years before it wished to use the
invention to reduce carbon emissions, Article 31(b) could be
used. Similarly, if the patentee of a first eco-friendly
invention refuses to grant a license to a second patentee of an
improvement (the dependent patent) of this first invention,
Article 31(l) could be used to force him to do so. 62
Such compulsorily licensing of proprietary renewable energy
technology would enable domestic firms to develop the capacity to
produce and deploy clean energy technology. 63 While it does not appear
that any state has attempted to use Article 31 of TRIPS in the context of
environmental issues such as climate change, 64 there is no bar from
doing so.
A. The Text of TRIPS and Patent Law History Support Compulsory
Licensing of Environmentally Friendly Technology
Although environmental issues are not specifically mentioned in
Article 31 of TRIPS, there are no subject matter restrictions to the Article
that prevent its use for green technology, 65 and environmental
considerations are prevalent in other areas of the agreement. Paragraph 2
of Article 27 allows WTO member states to prohibit the patentability of
inventions in order “to protect ordre public or morality,
including. . .avoid[ing] serious prejudice to the environment.”66 No clear
standard is provided for what is considered ordre public or what is
considered serious prejudice to the environment, 67 but air pollution is
(counting 262 deaths from Bird Flu worldwide); WHO, Anthrax in the United States (Nov. 21,
2001), available at http://www.who.int/csr/don/2001_11_23/en/index.html (counting five deaths
from anthrax in the United States).
62. Estelle Derclaye, Intellectual Property Rights and Global Warming, 12 MARQ. I NTELL.
PROP . L. REV. 263, 281 (2008).
63. Weiner, supra note 12, at 298.
64. Derclaye, supra note 63, at 274.
65. Ho, supra note 29, at 397.
66. TRIPS, supra note 9, at art. 27.
67. Carlos Correa, Integrating Public Health Concerns into Patent Legislation in Developing
Countries, at 12 (2000), available at http://www.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/h2963e/h2963e.pdf;
Derclaye, supra note 63, at 274.
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certainly harmful to the environment. While this provision pertains to
requirements for patentability, not compulsory licensing, it could be used
to support the notion that ignoring patent rights of green technology is
necessary to “avoid serious prejudice to the environment.”
In addition to the text of TRIPS and subsequent declarations, the
effect of patents on the environment is one of the factors taken under
consideration in other areas of patent law. There have been legal disputes
on the patentability of inventions that have had or may have an effect on
the environment, such as genetically modified animals or plants. 68 The
Harvard/Onco Mouse decision, before the European Patent Office
(EPO), involved the patentability of a genetically modified mouse
designed to help find the cure for cancer. In this case, the court upheld
the patent, weighing the “possible risks to the environment” against the
“usefulness to mankind.”69 In a similar case with an opposite holding,
the EPO refused a patent application for a mouse that was genetically
modified to lose hair on the grounds that the harm to the animal was
greater than the benefit of the invention. 70
These decisions are distinguishable in that they concern the
patentability of inventions that could potentially harm the environment,
rather than the potential for ignoring patents on inventions that help the
environment. Nonetheless, these decisions demonstrate that
environmental impact is already considered during the application
process.
A recent decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit shows that courts can easily do the same in determining whether
a compulsory license should be issued. In Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor
Corp., the District Court issued an ongoing-royalty order that, like a
compulsory license, allowed Toyota (the infringer) to continue to use the
plaintiff’s patented hybrid automobile technology in exchange for a
twenty-five dollar royalty payment for every car that used the
technology.71 Toyota successfully argued that an injunction should not
be issued against its use of the patented technology because doing so
would be contrary to the public interest in reducing harmful emissions
and dependence on foreign oil.72 As set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court
68. Derclaye, supra note 63, at 274.
69. Harvard/Onco-Mouse, T 19/90 [1990] E.P.O.R. 501, 513; T 0315/03, Transgenic
animals/HARVARD (July 6, 2004), http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/pdf/t030315ex1.pdf;
Derclaye, supra note 63, at 275.
70. Derclaye, supra note 63, at 275.
71. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
72. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139 at *3 (E.D.
Tex. 2006) [hereinafter Paice District decision].
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in eBay v. MercExchange, public interest is one of the four factors
considered by courts in determining whether an injunction in patent
infringement suits should be ordered.73 While the Federal Circuit in
Paice vacated and remanded the ongoing-royalty rate because it was not
supported by any reason why twenty-five dollars was an appropriate
royalty, it did not object to the District Court’s decision to allow Toyota
to continue to use the technology without the plaintiff’s permission. 74
Thus, the text of TRIPS and patent case law involving both patentability
and compulsory licensing can be used to support the compulsory
licensing of green technology.
B. The Use of Compulsory Licensing Has Broadened in Scope
Some argue that compulsory licensing for “emergencies” should not
be applied to long-term environmental problems like climate change, 75
and should only be available for widespread epidemics where access to a
particular drug is insufficient.76 However, both the 2003 WTO Decision
and the 2006 EU Regulation on Compulsory Licensing expressly state
that no limits exist on the scope of diseases for which compulsory
licenses may be granted. 77 While the use of compulsory licensing has
been considerably more common for drugs that treat widespread
epidemics like AIDS, there has been a recent shift toward using
compulsory licensing for a wider spectrum of public health issues. 78
For example, in 2007, Thailand became the first state to expand the
scope of compulsory licensing to chronic diseases when it issued a
compulsory license for the heart medication Plavix. 79 In 2008, Thailand
went further by granting compulsory licenses for breast and lung cancer
medicines,80 and threatened to do the same for anti-cholesterol drugs.81
Applications for compulsory licensing for several cancer drugs are also

73. eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
74. Paice LLC, 504 F.3d at 1315.
75. Roger Bate, Editorial, Thailand's Patent Attack, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 13, 2007, at Op. 9,
available at http://www.nysun.com/opinion/thailands-patent-attack/48499/.
76. Tom Giovanetti, Intellectual Property and the U.S Auto Industry, IPI Policy Bytes, Feb. 4,
2009, available at http://www.policybytes.org/Blog/PolicyBytes.nsf/dx/intellectual-property-andthe-u.s.-auto-industry.htm.
77. 2003 WTO Decision, supra note 33, at 510; 2006 Council Regulation, supra note 34.
78. Simon Montlake, Thailand Widens Scope of Generic Drugs, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Jan. 31, 2007, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0131/p07s02-woap.html?s=hns.
79. Id.
80. Compulsory Licensing Will Continue, Says Minister, BANGKOK POST, Aug. 15, 2008,
available at http://www.bangkokpost.com/150808_News/15Aug2008_news96.php.
81. Bate, supra note 76.
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being considered in India.82
While Thailand’s broadened use of compulsory licensing has
received significant criticism, 83 this use does not appear to violate any
portion of TRIPS.84 Widening the scope of compulsory licensing to
include long-term public health issues such as breast cancer could
potentially open the door for compulsory licensing of technology that can
help reduce climate change, a problem that certainly impacts long-term
public health.
V. THE RAMIFICATIONS OF ISSUING COMPULSORY LICENSES FOR GREEN
TECHNOLOGY
Despite the legal availability and initial appeal of compulsory
licenses for green technology, such licensing would result in
disadvantages for the licensing state and for innovation generally. Many
criticisms of compulsory licensing in the pharmaceutical context, such as
decreased incentives to innovate and potential economic backlash, apply
with equal force in the context of energy-efficient technology. Moreover,
key differences between the two fields make green technology a
considerably less appropriate candidate for compulsory licensing.
A. Compulsory Licensing Creates Economic Backlashes
Even if a developing state was convinced that it could legally grant
compulsory licenses for a particular green technology, it would
undoubtedly fear the international backlash that would likely follow.
Such fears are not without good reason, as repercussions have occurred
in the past. The United States in particular has dealt harshly with states
that have attempted to issue compulsory licenses. 85
Although a state’s grant of a particular compulsory license may
technically comply with TRIPS, and thus enjoy immunity from
challenges through the WTO’s dispute resolution system, the state may
nonetheless suffer unilateral trade sanctions.86 For example, after
Thailand approved a compulsory license for the AIDS drug Kaletra, the
82. Khomba Singh, NGO to Seek Compulsory Licensing of Cancer Drugs, ECON. TIMES, Mar.
31,
2008,
available
at
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/News/News_By_Industry/Healthcare__Biotech/Pharmaceutica
ls/NGO_to_seek_compulsory_licensing_of_cancer_drugs/articleshow/2912621.cms.
83. Ho, supra note 29, at 421-24.
84. Id. at 442.
85. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 DUKE L.J.
1693, 1717 (2008).
86. Ho, supra note 29, at 450.
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United States elevated Thailand to its “priority watch list,”87 a
designation that heightens the possibility of trade sanctions against the
state.88 Similarly, in 2005 the Bush administration threatened sanctions
against Brazil if it followed through on threats to issue compulsory
licenses for AIDS drugs.89
The potential economic backlash accompanying the issuance of a
compulsory license is not limited to governmental action, but may also
include actions by private parties. Patent owners may retaliate to a state’s
grant of a compulsory license on one of their patented drugs by removing
other drugs from that state’s market. 90 After Thailand issued a
compulsory license for Kaletra, the owner of the patent to the drug
(Abbott Laboratories) subsequently announced that it would no longer
sell some of its newest products in Thailand, including a different AIDS
drug that would have been highly desirable locally. 91 Such conduct by
pharmaceutical companies does not violate any international or domestic
law, because there is no requirement that companies sell their patented
technology in every state.92
A similar case arose after Egypt granted a compulsory license to a
local company for the manufacture of Viagra in 2002. 93 Pfizer, the patent
owner of Viagra, expressed great displeasure and subsequently cancelled
plans to build a state-of-the-art production facility in Egypt, noting that
many other states in the region were eager for such an investment.94
Thus, the economic and social repercussions from both private and
governmental sectors for a state that has granted a compulsory license
may outweigh the costs saved by the issuance of the license itself. 95
B. Strong Intellectual Property Rights Are Necessary for LongTerm Innovation and Diffusion of Energy Efficient Technology
Innovative green technology firms require strong IPR to generate the

87. Watson, supra note 54, at 152.
88. David E. Miller, Combating Copyright Infringement in Russia: A Comprehensive
Approach for Western Plaintiffs, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’ L L. 1203, 1214 (2000).
89. Reese Erlich, Brazil's Grass-Roots Fight Against AIDS, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 8,
2006, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2006/01/08/Perspective/Brazil_s_grass_roots_.shtml.
90. Ho, supra note 29, at 443-44.
91. Alcorn, supra note 52.
92. Ho, supra note 29, at 445.
93. Robert C. Bird, Can Compulsory Licensing Improve Access to Essential Medicines?
(Univ. of Conn., Dept. of Marketing Working Paper Series, 2008) [hereinafter Bird, Essential
Medicines], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1124035.
94. Id.
95. Ho, supra note 29, at 447–48.
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funds needed to operate and create new technology. 96 These firms
require enormous amounts of capital, and the principal collateral for
attracting funding comes from the proprietary interest they gain in the
resulting technology. 97 Regarding such firms, one commentator stated
that “patents are the foundation of their existence. Weaken that
foundation and the house quickly crumbles.” 98 Many renewable energy
technologies are not profitable even with patents and receive significant
government subsidies.99 Without the promise of significant property
rights in the subsequent technology, funding and subsidies will be much
harder to acquire as the incentives to invest in and create innovative
green technology may be diminished or eliminated. 100 While compulsory
licensing might be attractive for the short-term diffusion of a particular
energy-efficient technology, it decreases long-term investment in the
creation of more innovative technology, and discourages the diffusion of
technology for which compulsory licenses are not granted.
Joint ventures between multinational companies from developed
states and local companies from developing states have proven effective
as a method of transferring technology to those developing states. 101
However, a state’s use of compulsory licensing for a particular
technology decreases the incentive for other multinational companies to
engage in joint ventures with local firms in that state, as the lack of
protection serves as a warning to companies that the state may not
respect their own patent protections if they choose to do business
there.102
Such arguments against compulsory licensing are also raised in the
pharmaceutical context as reasons for why the practice is detrimental,
rather than beneficial to long-term public health. 103 The research and

96. Giovanetti, supra note 77.
97. Wilson, supra note 9, at 6–7; Rosenzweig, supra note 20.
98. Rosenzweig, supra note 20.
99. John H. Barton, Patenting and Access to Clean Energy Technologies in Developing
Countries, WIPO MAG., Apr. 2009, at 12, available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/wipo_magazine/en/pdf/2009/wipo_pub_121_2009_02.pdf.
100. Wilson, supra note 9, at 6-7.
101. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, TECHNOLOGY WITHOUT BORDERS: CASE STUDIES OF
SUCCESSFUL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, United Nations Environment Program & Climate
Technology Initiative 9–10 (2001), available at
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2000/ctifull2001.pdf; Wilson, supra note 9, at 6.
102. Cameron Hutchison, Does TRIPS Facilitate or Impede Climate Change Technology
Transfer into Developing Countries?, 3 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 517, 529 (2006); Robert Bird &
Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective
Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 283, 297–98 (2008) [hereinafter Bird, Impact of
Compulsory Licensing].
103. Avedissian, supra note 10, at 244–46.
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development of pharmaceutical products is costly and timeconsuming. 104 The process also involves a high chance of failure,
creating great economic risk. Pharmaceutical companies use profits from
successful products to both offset losses from previous failures and fund
future research. 105 Critics of compulsory licensing argue that if the
patent rights on those successful drugs are ignored in some states, the
economic incentive to invest in future drug research is diminished even
in those states where patent rights are upheld. 106
While many of the same defenses of compulsory licensing in the
pharmaceutical context may apply with equal force to green technology,
there are key differences between the two fields. Although compulsory
licensing might be appropriate in the pharmaceutical context, there are
many reasons why the same course is not the most efficient method for
the diffusion of green technology.
C. The Nature of the Green Technology Industry Is Not Appropriate
for Compulsory Licensing
Though the proponents of compulsory licensing emphasize certain
benefits created by such a practice, those benefits are not applicable to
green technology. For instance, proponents of compulsory licensing
contend that while weak intellectual property protections seem to
decrease economic incentives for transnational corporations to engage in
joint ventures with local companies in developing states, other
investment considerations play a much bigger role. 107 Some studies have
shown that strong patent rights actually have no impact on attracting
foreign investment to low income states. 108 This is likely because the
markets of most poor states are not large or lucrative enough and are
usually too geographically distant for a state’s decision to strengthen IPR
to influence a multinational corporation’s decision of whether or not to
invest in that state.109
However, such an argument is more relevant in the pharmaceutical
context than in the context of green technology. While poor states may
not benefit from stronger intellectual property protections, studies show
that strong patent rights are positively correlated to attracting foreign

104.
105.
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107.
108.
109.
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direct investment in middle-income states. 110 Granting compulsory
licenses can lead to a huge loss of foreign investment to middle-income
states,111 a category that includes China, India and Russia, which are the
major contributors to the increase in global pollution.112 Such was the
case after Egypt granted a compulsory license for Viagra in 2002.113
After this occurred, foreign direct investment declined in Egypt, despite
its cheap labor force and relatively educated populace. 114 Compulsory
licensing of AIDS medications might not negatively affect the least
developed states because their level of foreign direct investment is not
related to the strength of their intellectual property protections. 115
However, the use of compulsory licensing of green technology by those
middle-income states most responsible for the increase in global
pollution will likely be accompanied by a drop in foreign investment .
Supporters of compulsory licensing also point out that while the
proprietary interests created by strong IPR help create the incentives
needed to develop truly innovative technology, strong IPR may also
inhibit follow-on innovations,116 since the technical capabilities of
developing states are mainly focused on the adaptation and improvement
of technologies from the developed world. 117 The current green
technology patents are predominantly for minor, specific improvements
on the prior art, and, as such, strong IPR may inhibit technological
development of these sorts of innovations. 118
However, the existence of a plethora of minor, specific
improvements in energy-efficient technology means that compulsory
licenses would have to be granted on a variety of innovations to
effectively solve the environmental emergency because unlike one lifesaving drug, there “will not be any one technology that will be necessary
or sufficient on its own to solve climate change.” 119 Moreover, market
competition among manufacturers and sellers of these improvements
already keeps prices down. In the pharmaceutical industry, most
breakthrough drugs have no substitute and thus the patent owner has a
110. Hutchison, supra note 104, at 529.
111. Bird, Impact of Compulsory Licensing, supra note 104, at 330.
112. The World Bank, Data & Statistics: Country Groups,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20421402~p
agePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html#Lower_middle_income.
113. Bird, Essential Medicines, supra note 94, at 5.
114. Id.
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116. Id. at 527–28.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Rosenzweig, supra note 19.
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monopoly over the solution and can charge high prices for the duration
of the patent.120 However, because the basic technological solutions in
the renewable energy sector are no longer patented and have become
prior art,121 the value added portion of the exclusive right of the patent
owner as to each minor improvement of that technology is quite small. 122
These small improvements compete with each other, preventing the
formation of a monopoly on the overall technology, which, in turn, keeps
prices down. 123 While those prices might still not be low enough for
developing states to take advantage of them, this is not a result of the
monopolistic market imperfections common in the pharmaceutical
industry. As such, the removal of patent protection may do little to lower
prices.
In addition to problems with incentives, there are also problems with
definitions. If compulsory licenses may be granted for energy-efficient
technology, it will be difficult to identify what actually constitutes “green
technology” suitable for such licenses. 124 Any patented technology that
accomplishes its goal with a little more efficiency or with a slightly
longer lifespan could be considered “green.” Granting compulsory
licenses for every technology that fits such a definition may effectively
eliminate intellectual property rights on most innovative technologies
and the incentives those rights create. 125
Furthermore, inadequate manufacturing capabilities may impede the
value of compulsory licensing in the context of green technology. Even if
compulsory licenses for a particular product are granted in a certain state,
such a license may be worthless if that state lacks the technological and
manufacturing capabilities to produce that product. For example, if a
state wishes to make effective use of a compulsory license on a
pharmaceutical product, it must either have the manufacturing capacity
to produce the drug domestically, or be able to import the products from
a state (e.g., India) that is able and willing to do so.126 Even though
Thailand was able to grant compulsory licenses for AIDS drugs and heart
medication, domestic production has proven to be too expensive, and
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access to these medicines has actually decreased. 127
For states without technological and manufacturing capabilities,
importation is the only available method to acquire green technology.
The 2003 WTO Decision discussed above allows compulsory licenses
for exports of “pharmaceutical product(s)” under certain conditions.128
Canada took advantage of this provision when it used a compulsory
license to export AIDS drugs to Rwanda. 129 However, using compulsory
licensing to export patented products to developing states is much more
feasible for products like pharmaceutical drugs (which are small) than it
is for green technologies (which are sometimes massive).
Even if importation is feasible for a particular green technology, it is
unclear whether the 2003 WTO Decision goes beyond pharmaceutical
products and can be used in the context of green technology. The 2003
WTO Decision defines “pharmaceutical product” very broadly as “any
patented product . . . needed to address public health problems” 130 and
the 2001 Doha Declaration clearly states that “each [m]ember has the
right to determine what constitutes a national emergency.”131
Consequently, the 2003 WTO Decision is meant to be broad in scope.
However, it states that member obligations under Article 31(f) of the
TRIPS agreement may be waived only “for the purposes of production
[and export] of a pharmaceutical product.”132 A state trying to extend the
scope of compulsory licensing beyond the realm of pharmaceutical
products would risk violating the 2003 WTO Decision. Therefore, if a
developing state lacks the technological capability to domestically
produce the particular green technology for which a compulsory license
is granted, and if it is either unfeasible or illegal (under WTO rules) to
import such technology from abroad, then that compulsory license is
essentially worthless. The state would be left without the benefits of the
license, while still attracting the negative backlash discussed above.
D. More Efficient Methods Exist for the Diffusion of Green
Technology
The key differences between the green technology industry and the

127. Thompson Ayodele, Failing Infrastructure Renders Compulsory Licensing Pointless, THE
NATION (Nig.), Apr. 25, 2008, available at
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pharmaceutical industry not only make the former a less appropriate
target for compulsory licensing, but also allow for alternative, more
efficient methods for the diffusion of green technology. In contrast to
pharmaceutical products, the large size of most energy-efficient products
allows for the implementation of a tiered pricing system, sometimes
called “equity pricing,” where poorer states pay less than richer states for
access to the same technology.133 One of the main reasons
pharmaceutical products are not sold at a significant discount in
developing states is the fear of re-importation. 134 Large price differences
among states inevitably lead to the re-importation of pharmaceutical
products to developed states at lower prices than those sold
legitimately.135 Such parallel importation cannot be challenged, as the
principle of exhaustion (similar to the first-sale doctrine of U.S. patent
law) prevents this practice from violating TRIPS or any other WTO
provision. 136 The risk of re-importation eliminates any altruistic or
commercial incentive that pharmaceutical companies might have to offer
lower prices on drugs to developing states. 137 However, such fears do
not apply to green technology. While pharmaceutical products sold at a
discount in a third state can be easily shipped back to their state of origin,
“the solar farm installed in India [at a discount] will not be put on a
midnight barge to the United States.”138 Tiered pricing is thus an option
available to disburse innovative green technology to developing states
without breaking patents.
Rather than relaxing IPR on green technology through compulsory
licensing, it would be more beneficial to relax tariff and non-tariff trade
barriers in general,139 or at least specifically with regards to
environmentally friendly industries.140 The United States and Europe
proposed this course of action at the UN Climate Conference in Bali in
2007, but India and Brazil rejected the proposal since it was not
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comprehensive enough and did not include bio-fuels such as ethanol.141
The United States currently imposes a tariff on Brazilian ethanol, despite
the fact that it is economically cheaper and less environmentally
damaging than U.S. corn-based ethanol. 142 The World Bank estimates
that a comprehensive effort to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers on
the eighteen developing states that produce the greatest amount of
greenhouse gases would increase the diffusion of green technology to
those states by three to sixty-three percent, depending on the
technology.143 The key differences between green technology and
pharmaceutical products make the former a considerably less appropriate
candidate for compulsory licensing, and more efficient methods are
available to effectively spread green technology to the developing world.
VI. CONCLUSION
The continued global increase in environmental pollution, as well as
the growing role of the developing world in that increase, is certainly
troubling and is likely a “national emergency” under TRIPS. As such, the
diffusion of existing and future energy-efficient technology to the
developing world is critical to addressing this emergency. Given the
emphasis of the Obama administration on green technology, the recent
increase in funding for research in this area is likely to continue in the
near future.144 However, this increase in funding will likely be coupled
with the desire for proprietary interests in the resulting technology.
While a case can certainly be made for the right of developing countries
to ignore those interests through the use of compulsory licensing, there
are numerous downsides to taking that route, and there are alternative
methods for effectively distributing green technology, such as tieredpricing schemes and the relaxation of trade barriers between states.
While patent protections may impede the diffusion of green technology
to developing states, granting compulsory licenses is neither the most
feasible nor the most effective means of solving the problem.
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